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ABSTMCT 
Science started to become professionalized in the United 
States during the Jackson~an period. A principal aim of 
professionalization was to secure the goals and standards of research 
from interference by laymen by the institutionalization of scientific 
autonomy. Then and since, the scientific professions have sought to 
legitimate themselves by promising various quid pro quos to the 
society in exchange for the privilege of autonomy. The promises have 
included the claim that the study of science would foster morally 
disinterested habits of thinking and that the results of research 
would lead to practical., material benefit. Since the turn of the 
century, the claims of legitimation have in many respects been 
substantially validated, and the scientific professions have grown and 
prospered. But the very success of science, particularly after it 
became a favored ward of the federal government, combined with the 
arrangements of autonomy to provoke popular resentment and, in the era 
of Vietnam, rebellion. The turmoil revealed that the American 
scientific professions, at once respected and suspected, esoteric yet 
indispensable, were destined to live in tension with the larger 
society indefinitely. 
The professionalization of American science is in significant 
and often overlooked respects a product of the history of democracy in 
the United States. It is a commonplace of western belief that science 
is an ally of democracy. And in many respects it has been, from the 
Englightenment to our own day. We Americans still operate under the 
Enlightenment propensity, fostered by science, for an empirical 
adventurousness at once corrosive and constructive. Combined with an 
appeal to natural law, reasoned empiricism undermined monarchical and 
ecclesiastical authority and promised, through the understanding and 
control of nature, broad-based material advancement. Yet for all its 
alliance with anti-authoritarianism and material wealth, science has 
always been marked by contrary tendencies. The life of science pivots 
on the exercise of authority and in a special sense it glows with a 
spiritual fire akin to religion. 
The tendency to authority in science derives from the simple 
fact that all students of nature are not equal in preparation or 
ability. At the one extreme is the ignorant layman, at the other the 
esoterically knowledgeable specialist. Even among specialists there 
is a spectrum of talent. Some scientists have always been better than 
others, not only in productivity but in quality and judgment. One 
Newton, Darwin, or Einstein is worth thousands of lesser natural 
philosophers. Thus science, democratic in its tolerance of diverse 
opinions, is usually not democratic in the formation of judgments. 
The validity of the law of gravity can hardly be determined by 
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majority vote. In science, as Joseph Henry, the physicist and 
Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, once said, opinions must be 
"weighed, not counted."l 
Through the nineteenth century many scientists were religious 
men who understood the world to be God's creation. To lay flora and 
fauna away in specimen cabinets or to record the position of the stars 
and planets was to accumulate a factual variorum of the Creator's 
imprint Oil the universe. To study nature was to know God. Then, too, 
many scientists insisted as an article of secular faith that the 
universe was worth knowing for its own sake, apart from the material 
benefits that might proceed from the enterprise. In the nineteenth 
century such scientists distinguished between "abstract" and 
"practical" science just as later generations would distinguish 
between "basic" and "applied" research or between "science" and 
"technology." Henry A. Rowland, the Johns Hopkins University 
physicist, evoked widespread applause among his fellow students of 
nature when in 1883 he asked in a public address "what must be done to 
create a science of physics in this country, rather than to call 
telegraphs, electric lights, and such conveniences by the name of 
science •• The cook who invents a new and palatable dish for the 
table benefits the world to a certain degree," Rowland observed; "yet 
we do not dignify him by the name of chemist ... 2 
If Rowland manifested a certain dissatisfaction with his 
country, his predecessors of the late eighteenth century felt more at 
home in their America. Benjamin Franklin happily combined practical 
invention with philosophizing upon the nature of electricity. Thomas 
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Jefferson was no less interested in the flora and fauna found by Lewis 
and Clark for their own sake as for their implications for westward 
expansion. At the turn of the nineteenth century, American society 
was comparatively stratified, its churches generally pervaded with the 
tolerant spirit of the Enlightenment. The higher learning was 
generally free of untoward pressure from priestly concerns on the one 
side or from materialist demands on the other. Natural philosophers 
of the day were able to maintain a happy balance between God and 
knowledge, between the abstract and the practical. 
Yet as the nineteenth century progressed, the balance grew 
precarious. For as the common man demanded and increasingly won his 
just rights, he worked a social, religious, and political change in 
American society that the scientific community perceived to threaten 
the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake and its accustomed 
insulation from lay interference. Joseph Henry complained in the 
1840s: "Our newspaper are filled with puffs of quackery and every man 
who can • • • exhibit a few experiments to a class of young ladies is 
called a man of science.,,3 Any dabbler who collected natural 
specimens or fiddled with an electrical battery might expect to 
deliver his results before a scientific meeting or publish them in one 
of the scores of local scientific journals. Even the principal organ 
of research in the country, the American Journal of Science, depended 
upon subscriptions from numerous amateurs, its editor aptly observed. 
To a significant extent for the sake of protecting science against the 
invasion of a vulgar democracy, natural philosophers in America turned 
to professionalization. It was no accident that the 
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professionalization of science in the United States began with the 
Jacksonian period, with its democratic assault upon traditional 
secular and religious authority, and that it came to flourish in the 
era of Ulysses S. Grant, with its celebrations of material progress so 
annoying to Henry Rowland. 
According to the model advanced by the historian George 
Daniels, the professionalization of American science occurred in four 
overlapping stages: pre~nption, institutionalization, legitimation, 
and, finally, professional autonomy. Daniels' is a useful model that 
helps formalize the anti-democratic tendencies in the 
professionalization of science. The preemptive stage is provoked by 
the increasingly esoteric quality of natural knowledge, of the march 
of learning beyond mere fact-gathering to complex relationships, to 
systematics, to theory. In botany, for example, preemption followed 
on the spread of the Linnaean system, with its categories of species, 
genus, and type. Only specialists could classify new specimens, not 
the mere Sunday naturalist. The point in time of preemption may have 
varied with discipline, but in all disciplines it worked a similar 
effect -- the exclusion of the lay amateur from scientific discourse. 
The institutionalization of exclusiveness was no mean task in 
democratic America. There were numerous local scientific societies in 
the United States. Most, Rowland ruefully observed, were "dignified 
by high-sounding names," and each had "its local celebrity, to whom 
the privilege of describing some crab with an extra claw • • • is 
inestimable.,,4 At the national level in 1844, professionally-minded 
scientists formed the American Association for the Advancement of 
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Science. To be sure, membership was open to any interested layman 
willing to pay the dues, but the constitution of the AAAS virtually 
guaranteed the election of professional scientists to the governing 
offices, including a standing committee whose approval was required 
for the presentation of a paper at the meetings or its publication 
under AAAS auspices. Narrowing matters still further. in 1874 the 
constitution was revamped to restrict officeholders to a new, special 
class of members, or "Fellows," accomplished in research. Still more 
exclusive was the National Academy of Sciences, founded in 1863, 
admission to which required distinction in research and election by 
the existing, limited membership. 
Amid the proliferation of specialized knowledge, no single 
society or association could expect to accommodate the interests of 
the diverse groups of scientists that steadily sprang up in the United 
States. If scientists wished to insulate themselves from laymen, so 
chemists wanted to protect themselves from entomologists, physicists 
from natural historians, etc. Pursuing professionalization to its 
logical end, specialists in various fields began after the Civil War 
to organize special societies. The first in science was the American 
Chemical Society, founded in 1876. Soon following suit were 
geologists, astrophysicists, botanists, physicists, and 
mathematicians. Like the AAAS, most of these professional societies 
opened their membership rolls to the general, interested public, but 
they also restricted control of the organization -- of its offices, 
budget, journal, and meetings -- to an elite accomplished in research. 
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After the Civil War, the trend to professionalization in 
science spread to institutions of higher learning. Recent scholarship 
has made clear that the antebellum colleges by no means ignored 
science. Physics, mathematics, natural history, and often more were 
standard parts of the required curriculum. But the courses were 
taught largely by rote rather than with laboratory experience. Hardly 
any college taught them beyond the elementary level. And there was no 
graduate training to speak of in science or any other subject. But in 
the post-Civil War decades, a new generation of college presidents 
revolutionized the higher learning in &aerica. They fostered the 
introduction of laboratory work in scientific courses and created the 
elective system, which, liberating students from the constraints of a 
required general education, permitted them to pursue courses in a 
given specialty to an advanced level even as undergraduates. And, 
following the lead of Daniel Coit Gilman at The Johns Hopkins 
University, they established graduate schools devoted to training 
students in research. 
American scientists were gladdened by the creation of the 
university system. Not only did it advance their self-interest 
through the institutionalization of their professional aims. It also 
helped accommodate the exclusiveness of professional culture to 
democratic aims and assumptions. For if professionalism meant 
exclusion, the new higher education meant accessibility. Scientific 
training, both undergraduate and graduate, would make for a continuing 
supply of new knowledgeable talent, while the process of certification 
inherent in graduate work would permit the regulation of entrance into 
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science only of people qualified to pursue professional work. 
The wiser leaders of American science recognized that in the 
United States, which, unlike Europe, had no monarchy or for~mal 
aristocracy to supply the patronage of learning, it might be dangerous 
to carry the exclusiveness inherent in professionalization too far. 
And if they insisted upon independence and autonomy for science, they 
recognized that the larger society would expect a return for allowing 
them such privileges. The return they promised, what Daniels has 
called the legitimation of professional science, took the form, in 
part and for a while, at least, of calling continued attention to the 
way that the study of nature would fortify religion by revealing God's 
handiwork in the universe. But the natural theological content of 
scientific legitimation fell rapidly away after Darwin unleashed his 
theory of evolution and society grew more secularized. 
The more long-lasting claims of legitimation -- they remain 
with us today -- centered on three points: First, that the study of 
science fostered disinterested, even moral, habits of thinking, that 
science, in the words of Charles William Eliot, the onetime chemist 
who headed Harvard for forty years, "ennobles and purifies the mind."S 
Second, that scientists, at once expert and morally objective, could 
be counted upon to supply the nation with indispensable disinterested 
advice and guidance as it plunged irrevocably into the modern urban, 
technological age. And third, that the pursuit of abstract, or what 
by the 1880s was called "pure," science would eventually pay rich 
dividends, in the technology of material wealth, better health, and, 
to anticipate a key legitimation of a later day, of national defense. 
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Yet in the late nineteenth century, American scientists were 
more successful in pursuing professionalization than in convincing 
their countrymen to respect such claims of legitimation. The symbolic 
proprietor of the burgeoning electrical industry was of course not a 
physicist but Thomas Alva Edison, who once gibed: "Oh these 
mathematicians make me tiredl When you ask them to work out a sum 
they take a piece of paper, cover it with rows of A's B's and X's 
Y's ••• scatter a mess of flyspecks over them, and then give you an 
answer that's al1 wrong.,,6 Geologists from the National Academy of 
Sciences recommended that the government reform the homestead system, 
since it was inappropriate to the arid lands west of the hundredth 
meridian. Theorists had pronounced the homestead system dead before, 
cried Congressman Martin Maginnis from the Montana Territory. Yet 
settlers had gone west and, "practical men" all, had "seen the 
capabilities of this land which had escaped the notice of our 
scientists and statesmen." In the end, the Congress left the public 
land system intact. Congressman Dudley C. Haskell of Lawrence, Kansas 
expressed the pervasive evaluation at the time of scientific advice 
for public policy. "Now, •• if you want a lot of astronomical 
figures, if you want a lot of scientific material, then authorize them 
to get out there and dig and hunt bugs and investigate fossils and 
discover the rotundity of the earth and take astronomical 
investigations. But if you please, while you are there acting in the 
interest of science and in the interest of professional bug-hunting, 
leave the settlers upon our frontier alone,,,7 
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Federal policy towards pure research was even less tolerant 
than Haskell made it sound. In the l880s the federal government was 
perhaps the largest single employer of scientists in the United 
States. Yet Washington was hardly a haven for abstract research. 
Every federal scientist, beleaguered before the governmental apostles 
of utility, could understand the defense offered by one of their 
brethren before a Congressional investigating committee: "We are not 
fomenting science. We are doing practical work for practical 
purposes.1I8 The principal American arena for pure science was the 
universities, but there pure science was handicapped, even after the 
pro-science revolution worked by people such as Charles William Eliot 
and Daniel Coit Gilman. In the late nineteenth century, the 
university president exercised virtually autocratic power over his 
institution, and, with the exception of Gilman at Hopkins, he tended 
to use that power to foster teaching over research. Eliot and his 
fellow college presidents had reformed higher education principally 
for cultural purposes. They respected scholarship more than their 
old-time predecessors; they believed with the president of MIT that 
"Our aim should be: the mind of the student, not scientific 
discovery, not professional accomplishment. Jl9 In the late nineteenth 
century, the main object of the university was to develop character by 
diffusing science and its way of thinking, not by stressing its 
advancement. 
Thus, by the late nineteenth century American scientists may 
have succeeded in professionalizing themselves, but they had not 
accomplished the similarly important task of accOlumodating their 
10 
particular profession to the values and culture of the American 
democracy. And the points of tension between themselves and their 
society centered precisely on their principal claims of legitimation. 
If they considered pure superior to applied science, most Americans 
preferred the gadgets and machinery that made for material wealth and 
comfort. If they thought themselves valuable public counselors, 
advisors upon technical matters of public interest, the public viewed 
them as impractically abstract. If they claimed a special virtue, if 
they insisted that, as scientists, they were suffused with a moral 
disinterestedness, many Americans could agree with the opinion of the 
editors of the influential Scientific Monthly, who remarked that, like 
other men, scientists were "self-seeking, ambitious, and have their 
personal ends to gain. Can we assume that morally they are any better 
than their neighbors; or that, if they get possession of place and 
power, they will not use and pervert them to the promotion of their 
selfish objects? It is to be hoped that in the future science will 
become so developed as to react upon character and give us men morally 
as well as intellectually superior; but we are far from any such happy 
result ss yet."IO 
In the post-Civil War decades, amid the disrespect and lack of 
opportunities for careers in basic research. there was no general 
democratization of access to the profession of science. Only a 
handful of secondary schools provided any scientific preparation 
whatever, especially in the laboratory sciences of the day. In higher 
education, the number of scholarships and fellowships was minute; most 
young people could not afford an undergraduate education, let alone 
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graduate school or study in Europe. Then, too, as a Cornell scientist 
aptly expressed a widespread belief: "In this country, men devoted to 
science purely for the sake of science are and must be few in number. 
Few £!li devote their lives to work that promises no return except the 
satisfaction of adding to the sum of human knowledge. Very few have 
both the means and inclination to do this."ll As a result, American 
scientists of the day tended to come from a narrow, upper crust 
fragment of society. Most were the sons -- or married the daughters 
-- of well-to-do merchants, gentry, lawyers, ministers, or teachers. 
Almost all were white Anglo-Saxon Protestants. Almost all were male. 
By the late 1880s the American scientific community totaled no 
more than a few thousand people. Although Edison hired a few 
physicists, the typical industrial scientist of the day tended to be a 
consulting or entrepreneurial chemist or geologist, and such people in 
any case amounted to only a small fraction of the scientific 
community. By far a more significant scientific employer was the 
federal government. (In the late nineteenth century, in fact, one 
budget-cutting Congressman complained that the United States 
government was spending more for scientific research than all the 
nations of western Europe combined,> About half the membership of the 
National Academy of Sciences in the 1880s consisted of federal 
scientists. But federal science was differentially important with 
respect to discipline. With the practical purposefulness of 
government science, Washington was a center of those disciplines 
understood to be relevant to the government's practical tasks of the 
day -- exploration and settlement. Thus Washington was a center 
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mainly of the earth rather than of the physical sciences. Geologists, 
geodesists, or meteorologists were more likely to be found in federal 
agencies than physicists or chemists. Yet whether involved with the 
earth or physical disciplines, almost all scientists were employed in 
the sector of society that only upper crust Americans seemed to 
consider important, the academic world. 
It was with considerable justification that Henry Rowland 
lamented in 1883 that American science was a thing "of the future, and 
not of the present or past.,,12 
Not long after Rowland's lament, in the 1890s, the scientific 
community started demonstrating, with growing persuasiveness and at a 
steadily increasing rate, the validity of at least some of its claims 
to legitimation. Scientifically trained people, some from American 
colleges and universities, others from abroad, trickled into industry, 
often as entrepreneurs. Bringing with them a knowledge of basic 
science, they gradually introduced a higher degree of technical 
complexity into chemicals, petroleum. mining, pharmaceuticals, and the 
like. Typically, they fostered the use of alternating current in the 
electrical industry, which had hitherto relied on direct current. In 
DC circuits, simple algebra and an elementary knowledge of electrical 
phenomena would suffice the engineer. AC circuit analysis required 
the calculus and training in electromagnetic theory. Symbolically, in 
the early 1890s Thomas A. Edison sold his firm to a new combine called 
General Electric and left the light and power business for good. The 
principal figure in the G.E. technical works was Charles Proteus 
Steinmetz, a German immigrant with advanced training in physics. As 
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early as the 1890s, Andrew Carnegie, he the apostle of the self-made 
man, announced that the "trained mechanic of the past • • • is now to 
meet a rival in the scientifically educated youth, who will push him 
hard very hard indeed." l3 
The scientifically trained men entering industry arrived with 
an important piece of attitudinal luggage, drawn from their teachers' 
claims to legitimation -- that the pursuit of basic knowledge would 
eventually lead to practical and profitable results. Circumstances in 
the more technologically intensive industries ratified the claim. The 
chemical industry drew upon basic organic chemistry in such areas as 
dyestuffs and fertilizers, while the electrical communications 
industry was compelled, once it began to exploit the vacuum tube, to 
consider such phenomena as the behavior of electrons in gases. Hungry 
for the development of basic knowledge in areas of particular interest 
to their firms, the rising scientifically trained managers 
adventurously urged their companies in the decade or so before World 
War I to establish their own research laboratories. Typical of them 
were Frank B. Jewett, a Ph.D. in physics from the University of 
Chicago, who inaugurated what became the Bell Telephone Laboratories, 
and Willis R. Whitney, a product of advanced training in physical 
chemistry at MIT, who started the research laboratory of General 
Electric. Many of the scientists hired by Jewett, Whitney, and others 
were duty-bound to engage in reasonably practical research, but a few 
were permitted the freedom to roam in areas more remote from the 
firm's practical interest. 
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Among them, at General Electric, was Irving Langmuir, a 
physical chemist and Ph.D. who had studied in Europe. For some years 
at G.E., Langmuir explored the behavior of gases in the neighborhood 
of hot filaments. He contributed tellingly to the fundamental field 
of surface chemistry, but his research also, virtually by serendipity" 
pointed to a valuable technological innovation. Electric light bulbs 
of the day tended to blacken after comparatively short use. The caus.~ 
tended to be attributed to the air in the bulb, and much effort had 
gone into attempting to manufacture evacuated bulbs. Langmuir's 
research revealed that the blackening occurred as a result of 
interactions between the oxygen in the air and the filament. The key 
to a more long-lived bulb? Not to evacuate the lamp but to fill it 
entirely with nitrogen, which did not interact with the filament. 
With the advent of the nitrogen-filled lamp, General Electric's 
investment in the ostensibly impractical work of Langmuir was 
demonstrated to pay enormous dividends, a lesson that was not lost on 
businessmen in other firms and fields. 
Early in the century, professional scientists continued to 
urge the economic utility of science upon the federal government. 
Particularly active now were physical scientists, who insisted that, 
just as Washington had sponsored work in the earth sciences in the era 
of westward settlement, so in the new century it should facilitate th,a 
growing use of the physical sciences, notably physics and chemistry, 
in the national economy. At the turn of the century, the University 
of Chicago physicist Samuel Wesley Stratton lobbied for and almost 
single-handedly persuaded the federal government to create the 
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National Bureau of Standards, the first scientific agency in 
Washington devoted entirely to the laboratory disciplines. As its 
title suggests, the Bureau was created to provide authoritative 
standards and measures for the diverse materials and physical 
constants essential to the burgeoning industrial machine. Following 
in the tradition of his predecessors in federal science, Stratton 
interpreted his mandate broadly. so that the Bureau became a major 
center of research in those areas of the physical sciences which 
underlay the establishment of reliable measures. For many years. in 
fact. the Bureau employed more physicists than any other institution 
in the United States. 
Yet early twentieth century scientists were alive to more than 
the economic utility of knowledge. Like their nineteenth century 
predecessors. many of them advanced the claim to legitimation that 
professional scientists could provide expert disinterested advice upon 
the problems of a technological age. Amid the steady growth in the 
role of government in the nation's increasingly urban and 
technological life. the claim acquired ever more solidity. In the 
early twentieth century, geologists, heirs of the great public 
resources reformer John Wesley Powell, became enmeshed in the 
formation of federal policy for public lands and conservation; Samuel 
Wesley Stratton threw the Bureau of Standards into consumer campaigns 
for honesty in weights and measures. At the Bureau of Chemistry in 
the Department of Agriculture, the chemist Harvey Wiley helped spark 
the public debate over questions related to purity in foods and drugs 
that led in 1906 to the creation of the Food and Drug Administration. 
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In the early twentieth century, professional scientists came to form 
an indispensable cadre within the government's expanding regulatory 
army. 
The more the nation's scientific professions seemed to 
validate their claims to legitimation, the more they grew and 
flourished. The growth dated from the l890s, with the appearance of 
industrial demand for technically trained manpower. American college 
enrollments started to climb exponentially, and after the turn of the 
century, despite setbacks in war and depression, they continued to 
climb in the same fashion. Technical enrollments, particularly in 
engineering, but also in the sciences, followed a similar pattern. 
Often students who entered college intent upon careers in industry or 
medicine discovered that they liked science as such. Their ambitions 
came to focus on the professoriat, and not unrealistically, for in all 
fields the increase in undergraduate enrollments stimulated a steady 
increase in the demand for college and university teachers of science. 
After the turn of the century, graduate enrollments in science also 
rose exponentially. In 1920, American universities produced 280 
Ph.D.'s in science outside of engineering; in 1939, almost 1,400. 
During the period to 1939, the professions of science turned 
into an avenue of social mobility. While they did not draw from the 
bottom of American society. they did provide a means by which the 
children of middle to lower middle class families, often from rural 
areas, migrated to the urban upper middle class, both in income and in 
social status. To be sure, the American scientific professions 
remained overwhelmingly white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant and male, but 
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between the two world wars they also became an avenue of mobility for 
one minority group. American Jews. 
The Jewish entrance into science turned in part on their 
group's cultural attachment to learning, in part on their long-
standing belief that professional careers, which depended on the 
unconfiscatable properties of the mind, would better insulate them 
against the hazards of anti-Semitism, which could lead to the 
deprivation of property in land or business. (The refugee physicist 
Abraham Pais once remarked: "The Jew has the tradition of the book 
first because so it was in the ghetto, but secondly • because the 
contents of the book are inalienable -- even if the book itself is 
not. II )14 By the end of the 1930s, Jews were represented in American 
physics at least in proportion to their weight in the overall 
population. The combined presence of both natives and refugees from 
Hitler's Europe starred American Jewish physicists with a 
disproportionately significant role in the leadership of their 
discipline. 
Discrimination did a good deal to keep blacks, Catholics, and 
women comparatively underrepresented in the scientific professions. 
But the record of Jewish Americans, who also suffered from 
discrimination, suggests that discrimination was not the whole story. 
For obvious reasons, black Americans had no tradition of learning or 
professional aspiration. National cultural standards discouraged most 
young women from thinking about careers at all, and careers in science 
were considered particularly unwomanly. Women who turned to the 
physical sciences had always to expect the ambivalent salute that 
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Voltaire rendered his mistress, the brilliant Madame du Chatelet: "A 
woman who has translated and illuminated Newton ••• [is1 in short a 
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very great man." Women with a bent for technical subjects turned to 
"womanly" pursuits -- schoolteaching, nursing, the practice of 
medicine, or, perhaps, the study of animate, organic nature. During 
the interwar years, well over half the women scientists in America 
were in psychology, botany, and zoology, and more than three times as 
many women took doctorates in the biological and social as in the 
physical sciences. 
Neither academic discrimination nor Church doctrine played a 
telling role in producing the low representation of Catholics in the 
American scientific professions. More important were the pre-World 
War II poverty of Catholic higher education and of the American 
Catholic community in general. Still, the Notre Dame biochemist 
Julian Pleasants once observed: "Ours is not an abject but a 
discriminating poverty; it lays bare our scale of values by indicating 
what we feel we can do without." The modern American Catholic, 
Pleasants noted, placed "a very low value on • • • scientific 
research.,,16 Clannish in the face of the majority's hostility, young 
Catholics who could afford college preferred to prepare for work among 
their own group, frequently in the law. Besides, whether they had 
come from Ireland, or the nations of central and southern Europe, 
American Catholics generally derived from peasant cultures. In the 
old country, learning as such had been left to the priests; in the 
new, as an observer who understood his fellow Irish pointed out, 
"intellectual curiosity ••• was taboo because it was lazy and 
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nonutilitarian. But," he added, "a 'good head for business' -- ah, 
that was a gift from heaven, indeed 1,,17 During the interwar years, 
more Catholics went to college not only because they could afford it 
but because it had become an accepted and advantageous way to get into 
the most admired and financially rewarding of American occupations. 
But few Catholic students had any taste for careers in pure science, 
and few actually joined their Protestant and now Jewish peers in the 
scientific professions. 
From the turn of the century through the 19308, those 
professions grew at roughly comparable rates in all scientific 
disciplines, including the physical, the earth, and the biological 
sciences. All had strong contingents in the academic world. Some, 
notably chemistry and then physics, carved out solid sectors of 
employment in industry. For, following the examples of Whitney and 
Jewett at Bell Telephone and G.E., businessmen and philanthropists 
increasingly embraced the economic legitimation of science. The 
circumstances of international trade were enough to convince them 
that, if the United States were to compete economically in the world, 
industry had to support research, including pure research. From the 
1920s on, industry and industrial philanthropists donated considerable 
funds to the enterprise of basic science. Part of the money went into 
the academic world. A great deal of it was invested in industrial 
research laboratories, some of which devoted at least part of their 
effort to pure science. A few of these laboratories -- the Bell 
Telephone Laboratory is an outstanding example -- achieved world rank 
in their fundamental areas. Indeed, by the 1930s, in most fields, the 
United States had taken its place among the leading scientific 
nations. 
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The ascendancy occurred without significant federal support of 
science as we know it. For from the turn of the century through the 
1930s, federal science tended overwhelmingly to consist, in the 
nineteenth-century vein, almost entirely of research related to the 
practical concerns of the economy or of regulation: The FDA, for 
example, in order to carry out its statutory responsibilities of 
assuring the safety of what we eat and drink, had to sponsor an 
ongoing research program into the hazards of ingestible market 
products. And most federally supported research was carried out in 
federal laboratories like the National Bureau of Standards. To be 
sure, the federal government did begin in 1887 to fund research at 
agricultural experiment stations located at state or land-grant 
universities, and that support was enlarged both early in the century 
and in the 1930s. Still, agriculture was an exception. Before World 
War II there was no significant federal funding of scientific 
research, pure or applied, in the academic world. 
The reason, in part, was that American scientists were 
decidedly ambivalent towards the idea of federal patronage. On the 
one hand, they came increasingly to want the money, particularly in 
the 1930s, when academic science, like most other areas of American 
life, was undermined by the depression. On the other hand, they 
feared federal support because with it might come federal control. 
The fear was sometimes expressed in terms of Galileo's battle with the 
church -- that politics would determine what scientists could think 
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and publish. But the more common and profound fear centered on what 
had helped provoke American scientists to professionalize in the first 
place: apprehension that, through the instrument of political power, 
laymen might set the subjects and direction of research. 
Whenever the nation's scientific leadership had brushed up 
against the possibility of federal support for academic science, they 
had sought to reconcile what they wanted with what they feared. As 
the means of reconciliation, they usually advanced administrative 
mechanisms that would permit the flow of federal money into academic 
research in a way that insulated the flow from direct political 
control. They justified the demand on grounds of their requirement of 
professional autonomy, and by insisting that, as moral, disinterested 
men, they could be expected to spend public funds in the public 
interest. Again and again, their proposals failed. Politically 
responsible officials would not go along with such a mixture of public 
support without public accountability. Unlike other interest groups, 
which commanded millions of votes or dollars or both, the nation's 
scientists lacked sufficient political power to force an accommodation 
with the government on their own terms. Or at least they lacked it 
until in World War II they validated their most powerful claim to 
legitimation -- their utility to the national defense. 
American scientists, mainly chemists and physicists, had been 
involved in defense work before, particularly in World War I. They 
had worked on chemical weapons, aircraft, submarine detection, radio, 
and the like. For a number of reasons, not least among them the 
retreat into isolationism, there was no postwar commitment to research 
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for national defense and, during the interwar years, defense research 
was carried out in military or industrial contract laboratories and, 
for the most part, did not utilize scientists in the academic world. 
Yet the experience of World War I had sensitized a number of those 
scientists involved in it to the necessity and the possibilities of 
science for military purposes, and as the specter of war rose over 
Europe in the late 1930s, they decided to act. An exaggerated 
importance has been attached to the letter that Albert Einstein sent 
to Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1939, calling his attention to the 
military potential of the recent discovery of nuclear fission. 
Einstein's letter was not terribly critical, either for the launching 
of the ultimate Manhattan Project that produced the atomic bomb or for 
the wartime mobilization of science in general. Of central 
significance to both efforts was Vannevar Bush, a veteran of the 
submarine detection work in World War I, and a small group of 
similarly experienced men around him, who in 1940 prevailed upon 
President Roosevelt to establish what soon turned into the 
spectacularly successful Office of Scientific Research and 
Development, or OSRD. 
Headquartered at Bush's office in the Carnegie Institution of 
Washington, OSRD established no laboratories of its own. It operated 
primarily by contract, with industrial and with academic laboratories. 
Among its largest facilities was the Radiation Laboratory at MIT, 
which consisted of some 4,000 staff members at its height. Many of 
the Rad Lab staff were professional physicists, often mere fledglings 
not yet out of graduate school. The Lab had an academic flavor to it. 
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OSRD contractors successfully developed not only numerous radars but 
also solid fuel rockets, proximity fuzes, and myriad other devices 
that played effective, and often decisive. roles in the war effort. 
The atomic bomb work was originally conducted under a special section 
of OSRD, until, when it was sufficiently well along. it was 
transferred to the Manhattan District of the Army Engineers. After 
the war ended, Rad Lab workers liked to say, "Radar won the war. The 
atomic bomb only ended it. ,,18 
Radar or the atomic bomb, both weapons drew upon advanced 
physics and required physicists well versed in the intricacies of 
their discipline. The success of OSRD and the Manhattan Project 
convinced millions of Americans, ordinary citizens and high policy 
makers alike, that basic scientists were indispensable to the national 
defense because they were essential to the advisory system of national 
security and because they produced the new fundamental knowledge upon 
which the technology of modern military power rested. The nation's 
basic scientists thus acquired a degree of political power in America 
that hitherto they had not possessed. Not based on votes or dollars, 
their power resided in their command of an esoteric knowledge. They 
had become a strategic elite in American life, and they exploited 
their power to construct the postwar system of federal support for 
science to a considerable extent on their long-standing terms of 
professional autonomy. They helped create a system of granting 
agencies that supplied a rich level of funds to academic science with 
only a loose degree of accountability or control. And they forged an 
advisory system for federal science, culminating in the establishment 
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of the President's Science Advisory Committee in 1957, that carried 
them to the center of power while maintaining their independent 
academic and industrial bases. 
In the quarter century after World War II, the professions of 
science flourished in the United States far beyond the dreams of their 
pre-World War II, let alone nineteenth century, leadership. The 
exponential increase in the number of scientists continued. In 1970 
American universities produced more than 10,000 doctorates in science 
outside of engineering, and there were almost a half a million 
scientists practicing in the United States. The federal budget for 
research and development burgeoned, reaching some $15 billion per year 
by 1967. Academic, industrial, and governmental science departments 
expanded steadily, and American scientists commanded the world, 
winning the lion's share of Nobel Prizes of the period. Yet despite 
the apparent ratification of their traditional claims to legitimation, 
the American scientific professions lived in an uneasy tension with 
the larger society. 
In part, the tension derived from the very success of 
professional science. Rich, immense, and powerful, it was a salient 
target for dissatisfaction with wealth. size, and power, particularly 
on the part of those groups -- women, blacks, and Catholics -- whom it 
tended not to include. In part, the tension lay in the content of the 
legitimation, in the strong identification of science with industry 
and the military. During the depression science had been charged with 
responsibility for undercutting humanistic values, for making possible 
a technology that robbed people of their jobs. In the late 1960s 
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these themes were revived, new charges added, and all with the 
virulence that pervaded the dissent from the war in Vietnam. People, 
the critic John Leonard observed, tended to blame the perversions of 
modern technological society on single causes, but the cause most 
prevalently blamed, and with special animosity among those of a 
humanist or literary sensibility, was science -- "science," which in 
Leonard's itemization, "brought you technology ••• ; science, which 
has steadily reduced the number of things for which God can be held 
accountable and, thereby, pinned the rap on man ••• that science. 
And those scientists."19 
Scientists may have proudly claimed legitimation by 
identifying their works with technological progress. They may have 
happily accepted the patronage that came with such legitimation from 
industry and the military. In the era of Vietnam not only exponents 
of the New Left but many liberals, too, indicted scientists for 
contributing to the degradation of the environment, the 
destructiveness of the military, and for advancing a barbarous 
industrial and military power. Scientists may have taken a certain 
satisfaction from their involvement in the post-1945 governmental 
advisory structure. They were considered suspect merely by virtue of 
association with the military. No matter that some of them had fought 
to slow the strategic arms race. According to Fred Bramfman, the head 
of an anti-war research group, such efforts merely meant that the 
scientists involved in them were "lesser, rather than greater, war 
criminals. They are dramatic examples of how it is possible to be a 
moderate, well-meaning, decent war criminal.,,20 
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Yet in more profound part, the tension between the nation's 
professional scientists and their society lay in the inevitable 
conflict between the demands of professional autonomy and the 
requirements of democratic accountability. Through most of the post-
World War II era, the government's scientific advisers had tended to 
avoid the normal political process of open pressure, advocacy, and 
debate. "The overwhelming majority had never wanted any part of 
this," John Fischer, the editor of Harper's, wrote with dismay. 
"Typically, they regard the political process as something sinister if 
not dirty; often they treat politicians •• and sometimes the 
ordinary voter as well with scarcely veiled contempt. ,,21 If such 
attitudes displeased Americans, so increasingly did a salient product 
of the generally closed-door politics of science -- the penchant of 
governmental Rand D policy for stressing, outside of industrially and 
militarily relevant work, research in esoteric areas of pure science. 
How justify enormous expenditures for particle accelerators, critics 
asked vociferously, when the cities were clogged in traffic, slums, 
and pollution? By 1970 a growing number of Americans were asking with 
the respected journalist Meg Greenfield: "As presiders over the 
national science purse, are the scientists speaking in the interests 
of science • • • government or • • • their own institutions? Is their 
policy advice • • • offered in furtherance of national objectives --
b"" h " b"" 1,,22 or agency 0 Ject1ves -- or t e1r own 0 Ject1ves 
As a result of the rebellion of the Vietnam era, the 
scientific professions in America suffered a degree of 
disestablishment. Among the salient characteristics of the change 
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have been a shaping of federal scientific programs in a way more 
responsive to social needs, a greater role for laymen in determining 
research objectives, and a drop in the rate of real growth -- in a 
number of years it fell to zero or below -- in federal scientific 
support. But the prestige of the scientific professions, if not the 
same as in the heady quarter century after Hiroshima, remains at an 
enviably high level. So does federal funding for Rand D. So does 
the power that the professions of science wield in American life. If 
Americans are uncomfortable with, and at times rebellious towards, 
insistently autonomous groups, they also recognize the considerable 
merits in the claims of legitimation advanced by professional 
scientists for the last century and a half. Suspected yet respected, 
esoteric yet indispensable, the nation's professional scientists are 
bound to operate in tension with their society indefinitely. 
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